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HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACEKEEPERS AND THE ISSUE OF DETENTION 
CEDRIC DE KOKER* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the evolution in the tasks and responsibilities undertaken by contemporary peace 
operations in states emerging from conflict, peacekeepers have increasingly become involved in 
activities that otherwise would be performed by state authorities1. According to DIEHL et al., 
these activities include amongst others election supervision, humanitarian assistance during 
conflict, state/nation-building, pacification, arms control verification, protective services, inter-
vention in support of democracy, and sanctions enforcement2. This situation raises questions 
about the applicability of international human rights law (IHRL) to peacekeepers, as well as 
about their accountability under that body of law. Arguably, one could make the case – as the 
proponents of the applicability of IHRL to peace operations have done – that peacekeepers, act-
ing as a surrogate of the state, should respect IHRL in their dealings with individuals, just as the 
state itself, and should be held accountable for any rights-violating conduct.  
However, applying IHRL to peace operations is not without difficulties and it should not come 
as a surprise then that some states, such as the United States and Israel, as well as several legal 
scholars have opposed the idea3. After all, the unique nature of peace operations has given rise 
to complex legal issues – i.a. the extraterritorial application of HRL, the relationship between 
IHRL and international humanitarian law and the accountability of international organizations –
, which in turn have made the application of IHRL a multifaceted and often controversial issue4.  
This is especially visible with regard to detention, an area in which human rights protection has 
traditionally played a very important role. Peacekeepers have in the past detained individuals 
for a variety of reasons, but it remains unclear to which extent they are bound by the vast body 
                                                     
* Academic assistant at the Department of Penal Law and Criminology of the Faculty of Law, Ghent University and a 
member of the Institute of International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP). 
1 On the evolution of peace operations, see a.o. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. 
(2008).; ALEX J. BELLAMY, et al., UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING   (Polity Press. 2004);Ramesh Thakur & Albrecht 
Schnabel, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement  (The United Nations 
University Press  2001). 
2 Paul F. Diehl, et al., International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution. A Taxonomic Analysis With Implications, 42 
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 33, 39-40 (1998). 
3 As will be illustrated in more detail below, the main arguments to oppose the applicability of IHRL to peace opera-
tions relate to the fact that the application of IHRL would jeopardize the effectiveness of the operations, that there is a 
fundamental tension between international peace and security on the one hand and human rights on the other and 
that the different requirements for applicability of specific human rights treaties are not likely to be met during peace 
operations. See KJETIL MUJEZINOVIC LARSEN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF PEACEKEEPERS 60- 61  
(Cambridge University Press. 2012). 
4 It should be noted that these problems are not exclusively encountered in the context of peace operations. 
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of rules codified in human rights treaties and case law or the extent to which they can be held 
accountable for their misbehavior. This leaves room for abuse, as has been demonstrated by the 
recurring reports of peacekeepers violating the human rights of detainees with relative impuni-
ty. Clearly, this is a dismal situation and additional clarity is warranted, both in the interest of 
the detainees and the international community.  
In this paper, it will be attempted to address some of the complex legal issues mentioned above. 
Due to constraints in time and words, the analysis will, however, be limited to the first part of 
the problem and focus on the extent to which, if at all, IHRL is applicable to peacekeepers, spe-
cifically when handling detainees. With regard to the accountability of peacekeepers for human 
rights violations committed when the detainee was in their custody, the present writer would 
kindly like to refer the reader to the relevant literature on the subject5.  
2 HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF PEACEKEEPERS 
As to the human rights obligations of peacekeepers, two important questions have to be asked. 
Logically, the first question is: do peacekeepers have any obligations under IHRL? In other 
words, does human rights law apply during peace operations? If this is answered affirmatively, 
the second question is whether the full range of human rights are applicable during peace oper-
ations, and, consequently, whether peacekeepers have to guarantee all the civil, political, social, 
economic and cultural rights of the detainees in their custody?  
2.1 DOES HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLY? 
Although the origins of human rights law and peace operations can be traced back to the imme-
diate aftermath of the second world war, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and the establishment of the first UN-peace operation, UNTSO in 1948, for a long 
time, the application of the former to the latter has not been an issue6. At the time, it was gener-
ally accepted that a clear division between the law that applied during war and the law that ap-
plied in peacetime existed and, as HEINTZE has stated, that “depending on the state of interna-
tional relations, either the corpus juris of the law of peace or that of the law of war was applied”7. 
                                                     
5 See among others Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective 
Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents 
Serving as United Nationas Peacekeepers, 51 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 113(2010);Frederick Rawski, To 
Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103(2002); Magne Frostad, The Responsibility of Sending States for Human Rights Violations during 
Peace Support Operations and the Issue of Detention, 50 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 127(2011) . 
6 LARSEN, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers 42. 2012. 
7 Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law, 86 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 789, 789 (2004). 
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Since peace operations were generally established to help supervise the transition between war 
and peace and as a result, were often deployed to hostile situations that cannot truly be qualified 
as peacetime, IHRL, which was considered as the law of peace, would not be applied.  
It is only in recent years that the application of IHRL has been pushed to the forefront of both 
public and scholarly debate. Although certainly not the only reason, the controversies surround-
ing past peace operations, where peacekeepers have violated the human rights of the people 
they were supposed to protect, have played a key role in this regard8. However, whenever the 
application of IHRL was considered, states were eager to reject the possibility by arguing that 
IHRL does not “fit within a context of […] peace operations and that, for various reasons, it 
would be inappropriate or counter-productive […] to consider human rights law as legally bind-
ing in this context”9. This so-called ‘square peg, round hole’-argument has been used on numer-
ous occasions in different forms by multiple states10. Hereby, they have implicitly claimed that 
demanding states to uphold the full range of human rights would, at least at the outset of peace 
operations, places too onerous obligations upon participating states and would negatively influ-
ence the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation.  
It is not entirely unsurprising that states participating in peace operations try to circumvent the 
application of IHRL, as they see the extensive legal obligations as an impediment to the 
achievement of the – often political – goals of the mission. This, however does not mean that 
these arguments should be discarded as mere political strategy.  On the contrary, a closer look 
reveals that there is some truth to the concerns uttered by states. As IHRL was conceived to ad-
dress a specific situation – namely to “apply to the relationship between unequal parties, pro-
tecting the governed from their governments”11 -, the goals of IHRL are not necessarily in line 
with the goals a peace operation attempts to achieve. At times, they even run directly in counter 
to each other. An example would serve to  clarify this point.  
                                                     
8 Over the last couple of years, numerous reports of violative conduct has reached us, ranging from instances of sexu-
al exploitation by peacekeepers during MONUC, to allegations of prisoners abuse during the peace operations in 
Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan and news of the failures to prevent genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica. 
9 LARSEN, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers 60. 2012. 
10 Germany, for example, has argued in their written submissions in the Behrami/Saramati-case that “it must be 
acknowledged quite frankly that at least during a first stage of a peace operation, the standards of [the ECHR] can 
hardly ever be maintained to a full extent”, see LARSEN, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers 77. 
2012. In the same sense, the government of the United States of America (USA) has repeatedly stated that the norms 
and standards of IHRL do not translate very well to the often hostile situations in which peace operations are 
expected to work and that as a result, IHRL is not the appropriate legal framework to regulate the conduct of 
peacekeepers.  
11 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 240 
(2000). 
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Under IHRL, BELLINGER & PADMANABHAN note, “criminal detention is the primary route to 
incapacitation of threats”12. Administrative detention – i.e.  the detention of an individual with-
out trial –, on the other hand,  is often prohibited and even if a specific treaty allows for the pos-
sibility, it can usually only take place as an exceptional measure subject  to strict requirements13.  
Clearly, the underlying idea is to limit the powerful state in bypassing judicial supervision when 
detaining individuals. During military operations in general and peace operations in specific, 
however, administrative detention might be the only possible form of detention available to the 
participating states. After all, to justify criminal detention, a state will have “to possess admissi-
ble evidence that establishes that an individual violated an existing law, and that satisfies a high 
standard of proof, such as beyond a reasonable doubt”14. Such evidence is extremely hard to 
obtain in the difficult circumstances peacekeepers regularly find themselves in and states will, at 
least in the early stages of the operation, more often than not have to resort to administrative 
detention to keep individuals who have committed crimes or in any other way represent a threat 
to the peace and security in their area of operation off the streets. Clearly, to apply IHRL here 
and require states to refrain from using administrative detention would be counterproductive 
and difficult to reconcile with the aim of the peace operation which consists in restoring peace 
and order as fast as possible. 
 Therefore, although some states have certainly stretched the limits of the argument beyond 
what can be considered as reasonable and have gone “unjustifiably far in denying the applicabil-
ity of human rights law during […] peace operations”, these concerns should definitely be taken 
into account when considering the application of IHRL to peace operations15.  
2.1.1 GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OF APPLICABILITY BY STATES AND LEGAL SCHOLARS 
Despite the above-mentioned objections, however, the relevance of human rights law during 
peace operations has gained support over time, both within state governments and academia. 
Two different trends can be identified to explain the gradual acceptance of its applicability, no-
tably the increased complexity of peace operations and the different mindset towards human 
rights within the international system. 
First, and this has already been stated above, the evolution in the tasks and responsibilities un-
dertaken by contemporary peace operations in states emerging from conflict have made peace 
                                                     
12 John  Bellinger & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges  for the 
Geneva Conventions and other Existing Law, 105 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 201, 211 (2011). 
13 The European Convention for Human Rights, for example, allows administrative detention only in the well de-
scribed situations (for educational purposes, in case of flight risk, to prevent a infectious disease from spreading and 
in the context of migration) of Article 5, §1 (d) – (f). Other forms of administrative detention, such as detention for 
security reasons where there is no intention to bring criminal charges within a reasonable time, are prohibited.   
14 Bellinger & Padmanabhan, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 212 (2011). 
15 LARSEN, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers 76. 2012. 
IGLRC 2014  CEDRIC DE KOKER 
5 
 
operations much more complex and have expanded the activities of peacekeepers into area’s 
that previously were state prerogatives and traditionally governed by IHRL. In some cases, the 
peace operations have even had to replace the state authorities in its entirety and govern the 
territory in which they are deployed themselves16. As a result, peace operations today are 
much more diverse and multi-dimensional, comprising both military and civilian compo-
nents. Obviously, and as LARSEN has aptly noted, “when [peacekeepers] take over the func-
tions of the state, it is inevitable that questions will arise regarding [the peacekeeper]’s com-
pliance with the human rights of the civilian population in the area of deployment”17. Pon-
dering about these questions, state governments and legal scholars – with some notable ex-
ceptions, such as the USA – have come to realize that IHRL can be relevant during peace op-
erations and that peacekeepers, acting as a surrogate of the state, cannot completely ignore IHRL 
in their dealings with individuals. 
This especially visible in the context of detention. During the early peace operations of the Cold 
War period the detention of individuals was in essence military in nature. The peacekeepers 
only detained so called spoilers, i.e. individuals who attempted to frustrate the peace process by 
for example violating cease fire-agreements. Later on, when the peace operations became more 
multi-dimensional, peacekeepers were sometimes called upon to detain and try common crimi-
nals and civilians posing a threat to security, normally a prerogative of state authorities. This has 
added an entirely new dimension to the work of the peacekeepers as different interests, rules 
and standards come into play. After all, law enforcement has traditionally been an area in which 
IHRL has played a significant role and since the rules of international humanitarian law are less 
suited to apply in the context of law enforcement, it appears difficult to completely reject the 
applicability of IHRL as this would create a legal vacuum.   
The second trend, namely the evolution towards a different mindset towards human rights in 
the international system, has only reinforced arguments in favor of the applicability of IHRL. 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which was a collection 
of general norms with more moral than legal force, the IHRL has evolved into a well-elaborated 
and precise set of legally binding rules and standards, codified in human rights treaties and su-
                                                     
16 This was the case, for example, in Kosovo and East Timor, where after a violent conflict there was no functioning 
government after the public officials of Serbia and Indonesia had retreated from the respective territories. To fill the 
governmental vacuum, the peace operations – UNMIK and UNTAET – installed transitional administrations. On the 
subject, see a.o. ERIC DE BRABANDERE, POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW : INTERNATIONAL 
TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY, AND FOREIGN OCCUPATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE   (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 2009).  
17 LARSEN, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers 44. 2012. 
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pervised by international courts and tribunals18.  Additionally, within the international commu-
nity, different organizations, and especially the UN, have gone through significant lengths to 
integrate a human rights perspective into their daily work and policies. The protection of human 
rights has become an important part of the work of international organizations and as a result, 
has influenced other areas of international law19. With regard to peace operations in general and 
detention during these operations in specific, these two developments have had two noteworthy 
consequences. The first being that as a result of the increased attention to human rights protec-
tion, there is a growing awareness of the role peacekeepers can play with regard to the protec-
tion of the human rights of the civilians living in the area of deployment and the individuals 
they detain. The second is that since human rights claims are increasingly formulated as legal 
claims, more consideration has been given about what the peacekeepers have a legal obligations 
to do under IHRL. In recent years, the amount of detention-related cases against states partici-
pating in peace operations before both national and international courts have increased expo-
nentially and the claims were often formulated with the legal obligations of IHRL in mind. 
Again, these developments have led to the recognition amongst states and legal scholars that it 
has become difficult to completely deny the applicability of IHRL during peace operations and 
with regard to the detention that occurs in the course of it.  
2.1.2 INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
Although states and international organizations had gradually accepted the applicability of 
IHRL, it was waiting for a clear statement by one of the international judicial and quasi-judicial 
human rights bodies to completely open the door for the application during peace operations of 
the extensive body of detention-related rules and standards found in human rights treaties. Giv-
en the fact that, as stated earlier, cases relating to detention during peace operations were in-
creasingly formulated in human rights terms and brought before judges, it was only a matter of 
time before a one of the human rights bodies would pronounce on the issue. 
In effect, in several recent cases, human rights bodies have had to determine whether the specif-
ic human rights treaties were applicable to the activities of the state parties when they were en-
gaged in peace operations. Since peace operations as a rule take place outside the territory of the 
participating states, one of the issues that had to be resolved in order to come to a judgment in 
these cases related to the controversial and heavily debated extra-territorial application of IHRL. 
                                                     
18 This evolution has been adequately named ‘the legalization of human rights law’, see Saladin Meckled-Garcia & 
Basak Cali, The legalization of human rights: multidisciplinary perspectives on human rights and human rights law  
(Routledge  2006). 
19 This is what MERON has called ‘the humanization of international law’, see o.a. Meron, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW,  (2000);THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Brill Academic Publishers. 
2006). 
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Despite the continued resistance on the part of some states, such as the USA and Israel, it is im-
portant to note that most of these human rights bodies have at a certain point in time ruled in 
favor of applying IHRL to peace operations and that as of now, the extra-territorial application 
of specific human rights treaties is well supported in case law. The Human Rights Committee 
has explicitly endorsed the extra-territorial application of the ICCPR, amongst others during 
peace operations, in General Comment No. 31 and subsequent rulings, stating that:  
The enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of State Parties but must 
also be available to all individuals […] who may find themselves in the territory or 
subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party. This principle also applies to those within 
the power or effective control of the forces of a state party acting outside its territory, 
regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained, 
such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to an inter-
national peace-keeping or peace enforcement operation20.  
The International Court of justice (ICJ) later  adopted a similar stance with regard to the ICCPR 
in the Wall case, adding at the same time that under given circumstances the ICESCR and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child could apply extraterritorially as well21. It later confirmed 
this in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case22. Regional human rights bodies, such 
as the ECtHR and IACHR, have also accepted that whenever certain requirements have been 
met, the scope of application of the respective treaties can extend to acts committed by state par-
ties abroad. In Loizidou v. Turkey, for example, the ECtHR stated that: 
The responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of mil-
itary action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises effective control of an area out-
side its national territory23. 
It added in a later judgment, namely in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey, that: 
Any other finding would result in a regrettable vacuum in the system of human-rights 
protection in the territory in question by removing from individuals there the benefit of 
the Convention’s fundamental safeguards and their right to call a High Contracting 
Party to account for violation of their rights in proceedings before the Court24. 
                                                     
20 General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, Human 
Rights Committee (UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13), 26 may 2004. 
21 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 
2004,  p. 136, par. 108-113 [hereinafter Wall case]. 
22 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, 
p. 168, par. 215-220. 
23 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), ECtHR (application no. 15318/89), 23 march 1995, par.  62-64.  
24 Cyprus v. Turkey, ECtHR (application no. 25781/94), 10 may 2001,par. 78. 
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In sum, it is thus safe to assume that human rights treaties can be applied extra-territorially and 
that when the conditions for extra-territorial application are fulfilled, states will have to comply 
with the rules and standards enclosed therein when operating outside their own territory, in-
cluding when participating in peace operations. 
 Obviously, for the present purposes, the next questions then becomes whether these conditions 
for extra-territorial application are fulfilled when peacekeepers detain individuals in the course 
of such an operation. In this regard, it should be noted that it is hard to make definite statements 
since, as DROEGE correctly noted, “it is difficult to discuss the question of extraterritorial applica-
tion outside the specific wording of each international human rights treaty”25. Because every 
human rights treaty has its own scope of application, whether or not its norms and standards 
will apply to specific instances of detention in the peace-keeping context, will have to be deter-
mined on a case-to-case basis, taking into account the concrete circumstances of the detention and 
the application clauses of the treaty in question. Nevertheless, some general remarks can be 
made. For starters, the HRC, the ECtHR and the IACHR have all mentioned having jurisdiction, 
which was concretized as being able to excercise ‘effective control’ or ‘authority or control’ over 
either a territory or a person, as a basic requirement for IHRL to apply extraterritorially26.  
Second, on multiple occasions, the detention of individuals abroad has been recognized – again 
by the HRC, ECtHR, as well as the ICHR – as a situation in which the state can have such ‘effec-
tive control’ and therefore, a state detaining individuals outside its own territory should be con-
sidered as having legal obligations under IHRL. One of the early landmark cases in this regard 
came from the HRC with its ruling in the Lopèz Burgos v. Uruguay-case. The case concerned the 
kidnapping and incommunicado detention by Uruguayan state agents of a political dissident 
living in Argentina. The Court, before being able to rule on whether violations of various rights 
under the ICCPR had occurred, had to consider whether or not the conduct fell under the scope 
of application as defined in Article 2 of the ICCPR. This came down to answering whether a 
state had ‘effective control’ over the individual and as such, could be held liable under the IC-
CPR for acts committed by its agents outside its territory. In the end, the Court decided in favor 
of extraterritorial application, specifically stating that:  
It would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Cov-
enant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territo-
ry of another State which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory27. 
                                                     
25 Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations 
of Armed Conflict, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 310, 325 (2007). 
26 Id. at. 
27 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Human Rights Committee (Communication No. R.12/52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/36/40)), 29 July 1981, par. 12.3. 
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Although the case did not concern detention in the context of a peace operation, there is no rea-
son why the HRC would have decided differently, had this been the case. After this judgment, 
others quickly followed. In Coard v. the United States, which related to the incommunicado deten-
tion and mistreatment of individuals who were arrested by American troops during a military 
invasion of Granada, the IACHR held that the American Declaration applied whenever an indi-
vidual finds himself subject to ‘the authority and control’ of a state party, even if the individual 
finds himself on the territory of another state28. The ECtHR has, for its part, built up an impres-
sive body of case law in which it has accepted and elaborated upon the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the European Convention in the context of detention29. Some of these cases, such as the 
Al-Saadoon, Al-Jedda and Al-skeini cases, specifically addressed detention during peace opera-
tions, since they all concerned the detention of individuals by armed forces of the United King-
dom active in Iraq30. The Behrami & Saramati-case belongs in that same line, as it (partly) con-
cerned the detention of an individual by peacekeepers from UNMIK31. 
In conclusion and taking the above into account, the present writer argues that the question of 
whether IHRL is applicable during peace operations and consequently, whether peacekeepers 
have any obligations under human rights law when detaining individuals during peace opera-
tions, should be answered affirmatively. Although one will still need to examine whether, under 
the given circumstances, the case falls within the scope of application of the treaty in question, a 
consensus seem to be evolving amongst the different international judicial and quasi-judicial 
human rights bodies towards accepting the detention of individuals abroad, such as during 
peace operations, as a situation in which IHRL applies extraterritorially.  
2.2 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLY? 
The next question that needs to be responded to then is whether the full range of human rights 
are applicable during peace operations or whether there are certain factors that have to be taken 
into account that may exclude or modify the application of the treaties. In response to this ques-
tion, three scenario’s can be identified in which the application of certain rights might be exclud-
ed or modified.  
                                                     
28 Coard et Al. v. United States, IACHR (Report N. 109/99 - Case 10.951), 29 September 1999, par. 37. 
29  See for example Öcalan v. Turkey, ECtHR (application no. 46221/99), 12 may 2005;  Issa v. Turkey, ECtHR (application 
no. 31821/96), 16 november 2004. 
30 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR (application no. 61498/08), 2 march 2010; Al-Jedda v. The United 
Kingdom, ECtHR (application no. 27021/08), 7 July 2011; Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR (application 
no. 55721/07), 7 July 2011. 
31 Decision as to the admissibility of Behrami & Behrami v. France (application no. 71412/01) and Saramati v. France, Germany 
and Norway (application no. 78166/01), ECtHR, 2 may 2007. 




A first possible circumstance in which the application of IHRL may be excluded or modified 
relates to the legal concept of derogations. This legal concept, which is well established in inter-
national law, allows states to temporarily suspend the application of certain norms and stand-
ards of IHRL. However, from the outset, it should be made clear that states cannot derogate at 
will. Several human rights treaties contain derogation clauses, which limit the possibility of sus-
pending IHRL to certain situations and prescribe formal requirements that have to be fulfilled 
for the derogation to be lawful32. As to the situation in which derogation are permitted: although 
the specific wording of the derogation clauses differs, they are interpreted in a similar fashion. 
Derogation is only possible when a grave emergence exists which threatens the life of the na-
tion33. It is important to note that derogation is an exceptional measure and states can therefore 
only derogate to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do 
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social 
origin. Moreover, All derogation clauses contain a list of rights that are non-derogable. These 
rights are not necessarily the same under the different treaties. The formal requirements of der-
ogations are more or less the same under the different human rights treaties. Generally, for the 
derogation to be lawful, the states willing to derogate will need to officially proclaim the state of 
emergency which warrants the derogation and inform the other state parties, as well as the rele-
vant treaty bodies of their intent to derogate from certain provisions of IHRL. 
The key issue that needs to be resolved here is, whether or not states participating in peace op-
eration can lawfully derogate from detention-related human rights, such as the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived from its liberty. In this regard, it can be noted that in general detention-
related human rights do not figure on the lists of non-derogable rights and therefore can be sus-
pended34. This is confirmed by actual practice, as states have for example in the past derogated 
                                                     
32 The most important derogation clauses are Article 4 ICCPR, Article 15 ECHR and Article 27 ACHR.  
33 The ECtHR has interpreted and elaborated on the notion of ‘emergency’ recently in the A. and others-case. Reaffirm-
ing its earlier jurisprudence, it stated that “the emergency should be actual or imminent; that it should affect the 
whole nation to the extent that the continuance of the organized life of the community was threatened; and that the 
crisis or danger should be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions, permitted by the Convention for 
the maintenance of public safety, health and order, were plainly inadequate”, see A. and others v. The United Kingdom, 
ECtHR (Application no. 3455/05), 19 February 2009, par. 176. It has been argued that the notion ‘emergency’ under the 
other treaties should be interpreted in a similar fashion.   
34 The Human Rights Committee has argued in its General Comment no. 29 that potentially derogable rights could 
have a non-derogable core. Specifically with regard to detention, it stated that “in order to protect nonderogable 
rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of 
detention, must not be diminished by a state party’s decision to derogate from the Convenant”. This view is not gen-
erally accepted however. See General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), Human Rights Committee 
(CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11), 31 August 2001.  
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from the right to liberty and security found amongst others in Article 9 ICCPR and Article 5 
ECHR.  
The problem is, however, that “the legality of derogation […] in the context of a military opera-
tion abroad is not totally certain”35. After all, a literal interpretation of the derogation clauses 
would seem to indicate that, since the peacekeepers of the state wishing to derogate are active 
abroad and often far removed from home, it is difficult to conceive the situation to which the 
peace operation is deployed as an ‘emergency threatening the life of the nation’ for the state in 
question. On the other hand, if one interprets this notion broadly, as including “an exceptional 
situation of crisis which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized 
life of the community in which a Member State conducts a military operation”, states could law-
fully derogate36. Consequently, depending on the interpretation of the notion ‘threatening the 
life of the nation’, derogation will or will not be allowed during peace operations.  
State practice – as there is none – and case law do not a provide a conclusive answer with regard 
to this dilemma and as such, “the state of legal uncertainty concerning the ability of participat-
ing states in a multilateral force to derogate from international human rights instruments” re-
mains to exist37. Nevertheless, without going into much detail, the present argues for a broad 
interpretation of the derogation clauses as to allow the temporary suspension of some human 
rights during peace operations. This would give a clear signal in favor of the effective applica-
tion of IHRL during peace operations, while at the same time considering the argument that it 
can be impracticable and counterproductive at times to apply some human rights during peace 
operations. Moreover, as Frostad has noted, since the human rights obligations of states sending 
peacekeepers have extraterritorial reach, “it would be in harmony with such an extension of 
State obligations for State rights to follow suit - i.e. the right to derogate”38.  
2.2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
The second possible situation that may have consequences with regard to the extent IHRL ap-
plies, is the possible overlap with international humanitarian law, the body of law that stipulates 
the rules applicable during armed conflict. Since peacekeepers intervene during armed conflict 
and sometimes even actively participate in the hostilities – this will for example be the case dur-
ing peace enforcement missions -, it is not unlikely that they will incur legal obligations under 
IHL, possibly leading to a situation in which their conduct will be governed by both IHL and 
                                                     
35 Heike Krieger, After Al-Jedda: Detention, Derogation, and an Enduring Dilemma, 50 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR 
REVIEW 419, 435 (2011). 
36 Id. at, 436. 
37 Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially to Detention of Combatants and Security 
Internees: Fuzzy Thinking all Around?, 12 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 459, 476 (2006). 
38 Frostad, MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW, 156 (2011). 
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IHRL. This begs the question on how these two bodies of law relate and interact with each other: 
does one take precedence over the other and if so, which one? What if this is not the case? Can, 
and perhaps as important, should they be applied simultaneously?  
Providing a conclusive answer to these questions is extremely difficult, given the complex and 
heavily debated relationship of IHL and IHRL. Both bodies of law were conceived with different 
scenarios in mind (armed conflict vs. peacetime) and, as such, have differing theoretical founda-
tions and underlying motives. As a result, these different regimes will at times overlap, com-
plement or contradict each other. This makes it a daunting task to reconcile IHL and IHRL in 
practice. In the context of detention, these issues are once again clearly visible.  
Both the Third and Fourth Geneva Convention contain an extensive set of rules applicable to 
detention during international armed conflicts and there consists a significant overlap with the 
norms and standards of IHRL. At times, these rules of IHL and IHRL complement each other, as 
they were conceived with the same underlying purpose in mind – i.e. preserving the humanity 
of the detainee. This is, for example, the case with regard to the prohibition of torture and inhu-
man and degrading treatment, which is largely the same under both bodies of law. However, in 
other situations, the norms and standards of IHRL and IHL with regard to detention are in con-
flict. For instance, Article 9 ICCPR requires judicial supervision in the case of administrative 
detention, whereas Article 43 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions prescribes a more flexible re-
gime by explicitly allowing the review by an administrative board. Which rule should take prec-
edence? A third situation, but equally problematic, would be that IHL contains little, or some 
general rules on a specific aspect of detention, whereas IHRL provides a very precise and well-
elaborated regulation. Such a scenario is not inconceivable in the context of non-international 
armed conflicts (NIACs), as the IHL applicable in NIACs only regulates the treatment of detain-
ees, but remains silent on other aspects. Bearing the argument that the application of IHRL dur-
ing armed conflicts in general and peace operations in specific can be counterproductive and 
inoperable in mind, one might wonder whether IHRL can or should be applied to fill this gap. 
Clearly, these problems need a solution.  
Although, as PRUD’HOMME has correctly noted, “no human rights body has provided thus far a 
thorough analysis or detailed opinion clarifying the interplay between [IHL] and [IHRL], the 
issue has been discussed […] both at the regional and international level” and especially the ICJ 
has come up with several tools to manage the interplay between both bodies of law39. The first 
time the ICJ had to pronounce on the relationship between IHL and IHRL was in the Legality of 
the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons-case, where the question before the Court was whether the 
use of nuclear weapons during armed conflict would violate the right of life as laid down in Ar-
                                                     
39 Nancie Prud'homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 ISRAEL LAW 
REVIEW 355, 370 (2007). 
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ticle 6 ICCPR. In its Advisory Opinion, the Court reaffirmed the applicability of human rights 
law during situations of armed conflict, immediately adding that in the specific circumstances of 
the case IHL should be considered as the lex specialis and the test whether or not the use of nu-
clear weapons would constituted an arbitrary deprivation of life, could “only be decided by ref-
erence to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the reference of the Cove-
nant itself”40. 
Although instructive, the findings of the Court in the Nuclear Weapons-case did, however, not 
completely settle the issue and the Advisory Opinion has since been interpreted in different 
ways. On the one hand, some have argued that the Court had decided in favor of the application 
of IHL to the complete exclusion of IHRL and that IHL, as the law specifically designed for situ-
ations of armed conflict should thus always take precedence over IHRL41. This is, for example, 
the official position put forward by the legal representatives of the government of the USA. On 
the other hand, several legal scholars have publicly come out in support of the reasoning that 
the predominance of IHL “-though perfectly consistent for interpreting the precise content of the 
right to life – could not necessarily be generalized to all relations between IHL and [IHRL]”42.  
Given the discussion with regard to the exact meaning of the Advisory Opinion in the Nuclear 
weapons-case, it should not come as a surprise then that the ICJ was asked to elaborate further on 
the interplay between both bodies of law in a subsequent case. When confronted with the issue 
again in the Wall-case, the Court did just that: 
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights 
law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of 
international humanitarian law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of in-
ternational law. In order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take 
into consideration both these branches of international law, namely human rights law 
and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law43.  
This sheds more light on the issue and two general principles have been deduced from the find-
ings of the ICJ which should provide guidance when being confronted with questions relating to 
the interaction and interplay of IHL and IHRL. First, whenever the two branches of international 
law overlap and complement each other – and the right can thus be considered as being a matter 
of both –, there is room for mutual reinforcement (principle of complementarity). In such instances, 
                                                     
40 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, par. 25.  
41 See for example, Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict 
and Military Occupation, 99 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119, 139-141 (2005). 
42 International Committee on the Red Cross, XVIIth Round Table on Current Problems on International 
Humanitarian Law: International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal regimes, Interplay in Situations of Violence 9 
(2003)., at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/interplay_other_regimes_nov_2003.pdf. 
43 Wall-case, par. 106. 
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the norms and standards of the one body of law could be used to supplement, interpret and help 
develop the other body of law, and vice versa. Second, whenever IHL and IHRL overlap but 
contradict each other – and the right should thus be seen as a matter of one or the other –, priori-
ty should be given to the more specific norm or the norm who regulates a specific situation 
(principle of lex specialis), which can be a rule of IHRL, as well as IHL.  
These principles do go a long way in solving issues stemming from the complex relationship 
between IHL and IHRL. For example, with regard to the above-mentioned situation of adminis-
trative detention where IHRL requires judicial review, whereas IHL also allows for administra-
tive review, these principles would help to determine the applicable rule. After all, the lex spe-
cialis-principle would point to IHL whenever the detention occurs in the military context, which 
would be the case when combatants or insurgents are apprehended or when the detention takes 
place on or in the close proximity of the battlefield since the detaining power will not have suffi-
cient control over the situation to stage law enforcement operations. Conversely, whenever the 
detaining power does have such control and the detention thus occurs in the context of law en-
forcement, IHRL would provide the most appropriate framework.  
Yet, it should be noted that the use of the principles of complementarity and lex specialis will not 
provide an adequate answer on all occasions. This will for example be the case when IHL con-
tains a very general norm with regard to a certain aspect of detention and the application of the 
more specific standards of IHRL would be counterproductive. After all, as BELLINGER & PAD-
MANABHAN has aptly observed, “complementarity is helpful only when the purposes of IHL 
and human rights law are the same” and “when the rules offered by both bodies of law are in 
conflict, or when one body of law has deliberately left discretion to states”, specificity will not 
fully succeed reconciling the both bodies of law44. 
What is most important to remember for the present purposes, however, is that although the 
applicability of IHRL is accepted during peace operations and the relationship between IHL and 
IHRL is very complex, the overlap with IHL should be seen as one of the factors that have to be 
taken into account and can exclude or modify the application of human rights treaties. This will 
especially the case if IHL is the lex specialis. When exactly IHRL will be excluded or its applica-
tion modified, depends on the norms and standards in question, as well as on the specific cir-
cumstances of the situation under consideration and should therefore be examined on a case-to-
case basis.  
                                                     
44 Bellinger & Padmanabhan, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 210 (2011). 
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2.2.3 UN SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATES VS. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
A last factor that may possibly exclude or modify the application of IHRL relates to the “impact 
of UN Security Council resolutions on the application of [IHRL] in situations where the mandate 
of a peace operation contains provisions that are in apparent or genuine conflict with norms 
under the [human rights] treaties”45. Since it is not inconceivable that the mandates of peace op-
erations, as adopted by the UNSC, place legal obligations upon the peacekeepers that run coun-
ter to the legal obligations they have under IHRL, one might argue that the obligations dictated 
by the UNSC should prevail over those of IHRL. After all, Article 103 UN Charter stipulates 
that: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligation under any other international agree-
ment, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail, 
However, several issues have been raised with regard to the application of Article 103 UN Char-
ter to peace operation mandates, casting doubts about the relevance of the provision in this con-
text. LARSEN has accurately identified these issues, formulating the following questions:  
Does [Article 103] refer only to obligations that can be derived from the Charter itself 
or does it also apply to obligations which are placed on member states by decisions 
made by Charter bodies, e.g. the Security Council? […] Does Article 103 only apply if 
the Charter or a resolutions creates an obligation for a state, or does it also apply if a 
certain conduct is authorized? […] Does this mean that the conflicting provision is 
completely set aside or does it mean that the obligation under the Charter should be in-
terpreted in a manner that allows the conflicting obligation to remain applicable to the 
fullest extent possible?46. 
Although a full analysis of the scope of application and the case law with regard to Article 103 
UN Charter would lead us too far, three points should be made that will shed light on the appli-
cation of the provision in the context of peace operations and with regard to the detention that 
occurs in the course of it47. First, although the language of Article 103 clearly refers to ‘obliga-
tions under the Charter’, it is nowadays generally accepted that this phrase can also refer to de-
cisions of the UNSC. It would be difficult to come to a different conclusion, when one reads the 
provision in conjunction with Article 25 of the Charter, which obliges member states to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the UNSC. 
                                                     
45 LARSEN, The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers 314. 2012. 
46 Id. at, 314-315. 
47 For additional literature on the subject, see for example Michael Wood, Detention During Military Operations: Article 
103 of the UN Charter and the Al-Jedda Case, 47 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 139 (2008). 
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Second, the answer to the question whether authorizations fall within the scope of Article 103 
and should take precedence over conflicting obligations, has important repercussions in the con-
text of detention during peace operations. The authority to detain is often derived from rather 
general and vague norms to be found in UNSC resolutions, such as peacekeepers ‘shall have the 
authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stabil-
ity ‘.The UNSC usually does not use mandatory language when drafting peace operations man-
dates. Instead, it authorizes certain measures, such as administratively detaining individuals, 
which can help to achieve the mission objection, hereby leaving some discretion to the military 
commanders of the operation as to the right strategy to be followed and the most efficient 
measures to be used. Since administrative detention is as stated earlier problematic under some 
human rights treaties, whether or not authorizations are equated to obligations and thus prevail 
over IHRL, will determine whether such detention is available to peacekeepers in the pursuit of 
their mission objectives. 
In this regard, it is important to mention the Al-Jedda judgment of the ECtHR. As mentioned 
above, this case concerned the detention of an individual by British troops in Iraq and one of the 
questions put before the Court was whether the relatively general authorization by the Security 
Council to administratively detain individuals for security reasons took precedence over Article 
5, §1 ECHR. This article contains a limitative list of permissible grounds for detention amongst 
which such detention does not figure. After carefully considering the merits of the case, the 
Court made a clear statement by saying that: 
The Court does not consider that the language used in this Resolution indicates unam-
biguously that the Security Council intended to place Member States within the Mul-
ti-National Force under an obligation to use measures of indefinite internment without 
charge and without judicial guarantees, in breach of their undertakings under interna-
tional human rights instruments including the Convention. […] In these circum-
stances, in the absence of a binding obligation to use internment, there was no con-
flict between the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations and its obligations under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention48. 
Consequently, in the present case, the Court ruled that the authorization in the resolution under 
review did not fall within the scope of Article 103, that the authorization to administratively 
detain did not prevail over other obligations and that the British forces should thus have re-
spected their obligations under the ECHR. Although it is difficult to make any definite state-
ments about whether or not authorizations are ever capable of being covered by Article 103 be-
cause the Court only spoke out with regard to the specific authorization in the resolution under 
review, it is clear that, at least what the ECtHR is concerned, general and vague authorizations 
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will not take precedence in case of conflict with the relevant detention-related human rights 
found in the ECHR. Whether or not the other human rights bodies are of the same opinion, re-
mains to be seen.  
Finally, in response to the questions of what happens to the obligation over which Article 103 
establishes precedence, KOSKENNIEMI, who studied the working of the provision in the context 
of the International Law Commission’s study on fragmentation, answered “most commentators 
agree that the question here is not one of validity but of priority. The lower ranking rule is mere-
ly set aside to the extent that it conflicts with the obligation under Article 103”49. As a result, if a 
UNSC Resolution would, for example, oblige states to resort to administrative detention in cer-
tain circumstances – which is highly unlikely, but still – , this would only prevail over standards 
prohibiting or severely restricting such detention, without affecting IHRL rules with regard to 
other aspects of detention, like the amount of force that can be used during the arrest and the 
treatment of detainees.   
3 CONCLUSION 
As a result of the evolution in the tasks and responsibilities undertaken by contemporary peace 
operations in states emerging from conflict, peacekeepers have increasingly become involved in 
activities that would otherwise be performed by state authorities and are traditionally regulated 
by international human rights law. Detention can be seen as a prime example in this regard. This 
raises two important questions: do peacekeepers have any obligations under human rights law? 
And if so, to what extent? In this paper, the present writer has argued that the first question 
should be answered in the affirmative. Although one will always need to examine whether a 
concrete case of detention by peacekeepers falls within the scope of application of the human 
rights treaty in question, a consensus seems to be evolving amongst the different international 
judicial and quasi-judicial human rights bodies towards accepting the applicability of IHRL 
when peacekeepers detain an individual in the course of an operation. Whether peacekeepers 
will have to guarantee the full range of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights of the 
detainees in their custody, however, varies. In answer to the second question, three situations 
were identified where the application of certain rights might be excluded or modified. First, 
whenever states have explicitly let know that they  and have derogated from certain rights. Sec-
ond, whenever IHL and IHLR are applicable at the same time and IHL can be considered as the 
lex specialis because IHL will apply to the exclusion of IHLR. Third, whenever there is a conflict 
between the obligations (and perhaps authorizations) of UNSC resolutions and IHRL because 
according to Article 103 of the UN Charter the UNSC resolution takes precedence. The extent to 
                                                     
49 Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682), 13 April 2006, p. 170.   
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which the application of IHRL is modified and which specific human rights are concerned, will 
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